



## **2022 integration climate: Slightly more positive, with a few exceptions.**

### The SVR's 2022 Integration Barometer

#### Summary

The SVR's Integration Barometer captures the "integration climate" in Germany, a country of immigration. The latest, and fourth, 2022 edition is based on a representative nationwide survey conducted between November 2021 and July 2022. Since 2015 these surveys have been done every two years. The Integration Barometer looks at people with and people without a migration background. Within the latter group it provides a nuanced insight into the attitudes of ethnic German resettlers, people of Turkish descent and people with a migration background from the EU and the Rest of the World (ROW). Since the first survey was conducted the Integration Climate Index has been stable and positive, that is above 50. It was only between the two surveys in 2015 and 2017/18 that the Index dropped slightly from 66.1 to 64.7 points. Since then the trend has been positive. **The latest Integration Barometer registers an Integration Climate Index of 68.5 points, the highest to date.**

**This positive trend is especially obvious among people without a migration background. The Index improved by 2.5 points in this group compared to the last survey, from 65.6 to 68.1 points. But the Index also improved – by 1.3 points from 68.8 to 70.1 points – among people with a migration background,** although this increase was less pronounced. While the Integration Barometer registers an increase of 2.2 points among ethnic German resettlers, the integration climate among people of Turkish descent and people with a migration background from the EU improved by only 1.2 and 1.3 points, respectively. Finally, the integration climate among people from the ROW remained largely constant, increasing by only 0.8 points.

**People without a migration background in western and in eastern Germany have converged as regards their perception of the integration climate.** The integration climate worsened noticeably among people without a migration background in eastern Germany following the migrant flows, which resulted from the civil war in Syria. But the gap between eastern and western Germany has now narrowed. Despite this positive trend, the difference between the two groups is still 6.1 points.

Other findings of the SVR's 2022 Integration Barometer:

- **Social attributes such as age, sex/gender and educational level have a noticeable influence on how people perceive the integration climate.** Young people,

women and people with a high level of education on average rate the integration climate more positively than older people, men and people with a lower level of education do.

- Personal contact with people from diverse backgrounds – be it in the workplace, in educational establishments or in social settings – is felt to be extraordinarily positive by more than 90 per cent of those surveyed.
- Almost one third of those surveyed feel there are **barriers to the equal treatment of people with a migration history** within the educational system. More than half of those surveyed also do not believe that people with and people without a migration background are treated equally on the job market.
- **Perceptions of discrimination** and inter-ethnic contacts have a key influence on how someone sees the integration climate. While those who see discrimination feel less positively about the integration climate, inter-ethnic contacts have a positive influence on their attitude.

The 2021/22 survey asked about nuanced attitudes to democracy. It also investigated the role played by the transnational relationships of those with a migration history. Key findings include:

- More than 90 per cent of people with and without a migration background feel that the **basic principles of a democratic system** such as the rule of law and protection of minorities are important.
- There are **drastic differences as regards political participation** when it comes to German nationals with and without a migration background. The former are less likely to vote in elections and are also less politically engaged than people without a migration background. However, other political engagement – for instance going on demonstrations or membership in citizens' action groups – rises considerably in the second generation.

More than half of all those with a migration background have close **family members in their own or in their parents' country of origin**. Two thirds of these people have at least weekly contact with these family members. Second- and third-generation migrants are less likely to have family members in their country of origin, and they also have less frequent contact with these relatives.